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THE RELATION OF HISTORY TO THE STUDY AND
PRACTICE OF LAW.
By H. H. WILSON.

[Read before the Society, January 12, 1887.]

In this age of Hccumulated knowledge, he who would know anyone
thing well must be eontent to remain ignorant of many others. In
order to bring a limited area up to its highest state of produetiveness
the ordinary man must leave a vast region uncultivated. When one
like Mill urges that there is time for all learning, the old as well
as the new, it is well to remember that but few can bring to the
task the leisure, and still fewer the mind, of a lYE II. The question is
ever being asked, "How can I best employ a few years in preparation
for active life?" To the average young man who has but a limited
time to prepare for the work of his life, before he will be compelled to
enter upon it, the answer to this question is of vital importance. I
will suppose this question to be asked by one who has chosen the profession of law.
It may safely be said that no other professional man finds use for
so wide a range of knowledge as the lawyer. The nature of the law
is such that its practice touches the practical life of maq at every
point. There is no relation in life, there is no trani'action among men,
that may not become the subject of judicial investigation. There is
no branch of learning that may not, at some time, be of great use to
the lawyer. The doctor's profession covers a wide domain of knowledge, but there is no branch of his practice that may not furnish the
basis for a suit for malpractice, to successfully conduct which the lawyer must cope with his medical brother in the knowledge of his art.
The management of a vast railroad system requires special knowledge
Qf the several arts and scienccs involved in it, yet, in fixing the responsibility_ for an accident, the lawyer may have to know something of
them all. He, however, who would master all knowledge as a preparation for the bar will never enter the lists. Merely because a lawyer
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may be called upon to try a cause involving the proper construction
of a broken bridge, it would not be advisable for him to master civil
engineering before coming to the hal'. That his first case may be one
growing out of malpractice in the setting of a limb, is not a sufficient
reason why the mastery of surgery should form a part of his preparation. That chemistry, natural history, geology, and even theological
creeds may enter into the subjects of his investigations would not
justify the lawyer in attempting to master these branches of learning
as a part of his preparation for active life. He must necessarily
depend largely upon experts in these various branches of knowledge,
when it may become necessary for him to use them. These and kindred sciences are merely incident to the practice of the law, and while
a knowledge of them may occasionally be of great value to the lawyer, an attempt to master them would leave no time for the practice of
his profession. On the other hand, there are some branches of learning
which, in their methods of investigation, as well as in the knowledge
they impart, are so closely allied to the study and practice of the law,
that no one who would stand high in that profession ean afford to neglect them. Foremost among these stands history.
In estimating the practical value of any branch of learning as a
disciplinary study, for a particular object, we naturally inquire what
faculties are brought into activity, and what is the tendency or bias
given to these faculties by such study. For instance, mathematics
employs pure reason. The mathematician deals with the absolute.
When his premises are granted, the conclusion inexorably follows.
That the prolonged and exclusive study of such a science gives a
peculiar bias to the faculty employed, there can be no doubt. The
natural scientist reaches a conclusion which, while not so absolutely
certain as that of the mathematician, yet has the highest degree of
probability. While reason is still our guide we feel much less certain
of the ground on which we tread. 'Ve have now left the domain of
the absolute and entered upon that of the relative. Here we can no
longer draw our conclusions with absolute certainty; we are now called
upon to weigh the evidence and determine the preponderance of proof.
Probability, very strong probability, may be reached, but not certainty.
On the other hand, the historian is compelled to content himself
with conclusions whose probability falls far below that which attaches
to the conclusions of the natural scientist. Here we are met at the
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very outset with the most contradictory evidence coming from sources
which scem to be equally credible. From the very beginning we arc
compelled to test the credibility of our witnesses, to balance the probabilities of their testimony, and after all remain content with conclusions supported only by a greater or less degree of likelihood. It is
certainly no disparagemcnt to any branch of lcarning to say that the
study of one furnishes the best discipline for one pursuit, and that of
another for another pursuit.
To my mind it is this very inconclusiveness of its conclusions that
rendcrs the study of history so valuable to the lawyer. The historian alid the lawyer alike deal with the affairs of men, the most uncertain of all subjects of investigation. The lawyer is to-day dealing
with that ever-changing life of man which, centuries hence, will employ the future historian. The conclusions of the historian must
always contain an element of uncertainty, because the subject of his
investigation is human affairs, and his evidence is usually human testimony. Not only may this testimony be willfully false, but the
witness may have been mistaken, or so prejudiced as to render his testimony of little or no value. The first lesson for the student of history is to lcarn the pcculiarities of his author and to estimate the
influence of his bias or prejudice upon his testimony; or, as the astronomer would say, we must first eliminate the personal equation. No
one can safely read Rume without knowing his prejudice against the
church, or Macaulay, without making due allowance for his bias in
favor ofthe whigs. It is from a mass of contradictory evidence taken
from sources of varying degrees of credibility, and in itself containing
various degrees of probability, that the historian is to gather his facts
and reach his conclusions.
The study of history is a daily exercise in the weighing of evidence
and drawing conclusions of such probability as the proof may warrant.
The conclusions, while never absolutely certain, may reach that high
degree of probability upon which we would all be willing to act in
our own affairs even' though property or life itself were at stake.
What better training than this can be given to one whose busine:::" of
life it will be to try the differences between man and man upon the
diverging and often contradictory testimony of living witnesses. The
rules which he has learned to apply in settling a controverted point in
hist()ry are equally applicable in the settlement of controversies at
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the bar. For instance, should several witnesses narrate a transaction
exactly alike in every detail, the historian, as well as the lawyer, would
at once conclude that either the several narratives were copied from a
'common original, or were the result of conspiracy. Should the nar:ratives agree in the main, but differ as to details, this would indicate
:an endeavor to tell the truth; and should the several witnesses who
differed in the details of their narratives yet all agree as to a certain
fact, the existence of this fact would reach a high degree of likelihood.
In short, the general principles upon which the preponderance of evidence is ascertained are the same, whether applied by the historian or
the lawyer, whether the question involved be the fate of a dynasty
or the cause of a railroad accident.
The historian must ascertain the facts from such evidence as he may
be able to command, never absolutely conclusive, seldom entirely satisfactory, yet always the best that can be obtained. These facts, how-ever well they may be proven, if unorganized, are of little or no value.
It is their relation to life, their bearing on the course of human affairs,
that gives them value. It is then a part of the duty of the historian
to bring these facts, thus ascertained, into their natural relation to
each other, and thus show, if he can, their influence upon the course of
events. Let us illustrate this two-fold duty of the historian. It will
fall to the lot of SOUle future historian to ascertain from the acculllulated mass of contradictory evidence what actually did occur at thc grcat
battle of Shiloh. And surely if a few more of the eyc-witnesses of that
memorable battle volunteer their testimony, to find the real fiwts will
be no small task. This done, it will be the duty of our future historian to take the facts so found, and tell future generations the effect
of that battle upon the progress of the great conflict, and the effect of
the latter upon civilization.
The value of this training to the lawyer is apparent when we look
at the two-fold duty of the bat. ·While the lawyer is not the tribunal
that in the last resort ascertains the facts in issue, yet it is his duty to
assist in so doing. 'Vhile the jury or court is to find the facts; it is the
office of the lawyer to establish them by such evidence as a very imperfect and somf'times very corrupt human nature may render available. When the facts are thus ascertained, or should they be conceded, it becomes necessary to determine to what relief these facts
entitle the client. In other 'Yards, it no,v becomes necessary to apply
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the general rules of law to the facts of the particular CaSE'. At
:first thought, this would seem a very simple matter. Supp08e, however, thQ point at issue is one which has never been decided in our
jurisdiction. Suppose it be a qlle8tion of COIllmon law, and our own
state decisions do not cover the point. We must then draw Ollr precedents from the decisions of thirty-six independent states, having
thirty-six indcpendcnt jurisdictions, whose decisions are by no means
harmonious, even on elementary principles of common law. Add to
these a vast systcm of federal courts, as well as English and colonial,
and we have a mass of independent and often contradictory adjudications from which the lawyer is to determine what rule applies to the
facts of his particular case. These decisions, however conclusive upon
the rights of the parties determined by them, cannot be considered
the law itself, for the law cannot contradict itself; they are rather
evidences of the law, and from them we must determine, if we can,
the true principle applicable to the facts in hand. But where the adjudicated cases are hopelessly contradictory, what shall be our guide?
The plaintiff presents an armfi.J1 of authorities holding that the facts
entitle him to recover, and the defendnnt an equal number holding
that the facts constitute no CalIse of action. "What now shall be done?
The later Roman lawyers solved this problem by the simple rule of
addition. By statute the court was required to count the authorities
holding for the plaintiff, and then those holding for the defcndant,
and then he was to decide with the majority. If the number cited
was the same for either side and Papinian was among them, his side
should prevail. And as Papinian had expressed an opinion on most
questions likely to come up, it was a rare chance indeed if a judge
needed any acquiremcnts beyond simple addition to enable him to decide the most important and complicated cases. The modern court
asks for the basis upon which the decisions rest. The weight to be
given to an adjndicated precedent will depend largely upon its historical soundness. No precedent, however well established by adjudications, can stand long in the filee of modern juridical criticisms unless
it comport fairly with historic truth. No case to-day is so uncertain
as that which stands on precedent alone, with neither reason nor justice to Stlpport it. The law is not an artificial mechanism, but a natural
growth. There is a unity and continuity in the law that will tolcrate
no precedent long that does not harmonize with the spirit of its growth.
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Thc history of the growth of the law is but a part of thc more general histor:v of thc race, and no mcreijJsc clia,it of the courts cau stand
long against tlw admitted truth of history. The lawyer of' to-day
'vho relies merely on precedent, is having his foundation gradually
sapped from under him. Hc must learn that error, howcvcr often
repeated, does not cease to be error. He must learn that truth, cven
though unknown to Coke and Blackstonc, is the bcst authority upon
,,-hich to rest his caS8, and that justice is his most eloquent argument.
It is the chicf glory of th8 common law that it had its origin in the
cnstoms of the people, and that it is evcr changing to meet their nccds.
Century by century principles and rules become obsolete because the
life to which they applied has become extinct. On the other hand new
principles and new rules arise as the necessary accompaniment 6f the
new life born of every advance of the race. The historical law, the
law of the past, vanishes unobserved, and a new law, thc law of the
present, is ever arising to takc its place. The great mass of the law
is found in the habits and customs of a people long before it is to be
found on the dusty shelves of the lawyer. ·When the members of a
community have voluntarily assumed certain relations toward each
other, and such relations have existed so long that all have a right to
rely on their continuance, and important rights depend upon such continuance, courts of justice recognize these relations and enforce the
rights based upon them. The courts take up and crystallize the law
which the people have consciously or unconsciously made for themselves in their daily contact with each other. Customary law is as
truly enacted by the people as though it was adopted by the formal
vote of their representatives duly assembled. It is therefore clear
that when the circumstances which gave rise to any rule of customary
law have ceased to exist, the rule itself ought no longer to be applied.
Where there was no cxpress enactment of a law there is no need of
an express repcal. It is therefore one of the famili~r maxims of the
law that when the reason of a rule ceases, the rule itself cease.'l. It
needs no argnmcnt to show that in order to know what is the law of
to-day one must know the history of the people among whom the law
has grown up. ·When the lawyer is asked whether or not a certain
principle or rule of the common law is the law here and now, before he can answer with certainty he must know the circumstances
that gave rise to this particular principle or rule, and he must know
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whether those circumstances still exist. Then, whether or not a given
proposition is the law of to-day, depends, not upon whether it is found
in Blackstone or Kent, but upon its history.
·When we remember the strong tendency exhibited by law writers
and j ndges to copy from their predecessors, it is not strange that we
should find in text books and adjudicated cases many things laid
down as law, the reasons for which have long since ceased to exist.
It will be seen, however, that the common law contains within itself a perfect remedy against any hardship growing out of the enforcement of a principle or rule after its utility has ceased. That the common law is sometimes harsh and unjust may be admitted. A careful
examination, however, will show that most of these defects arise, not
from any original imperfection in the law, but from the fact that rules
and principles have been retained and enforced 'long after the reasons
that gave rise to them have passed away. For this, not the law, but
those who administer it, are responsible. A knowledge of the history
of its growth, and the moral courage to lop off the dead members, is
all that is necessary to preserve the body of the common law in a
healthy and vigorous condition.
A forcible illustration of the doctrine just set forth is furnished by
a recent decision of the supreme court of Kansas. * The owner of a
large packing house in Leavenworth rented the same for a term of
years at an agreed rent of $250 per month. The landlord insured
the building for $10,000. Ten days after the execution of this lease
the building was totally destroyed by an accidental fire, and the landlord
received the full amount of the insurance. The tenant thereupon refused to pay the rent and suit was brought to recover it. Counsel
for the landlord presented a vast array of authorities that showed beyond doubt that at common law, as taught in the books, the destruction
of the building was no defense to a claim for the rent agreed upon.
Judge Brewer, after a masterly review of the authorities, said: "The
general doctrine of the common law unquestionably wa.", that upon a
covenant in a lease of lands and buildings for a term of years to pay
rent, the rent could be recovered after a destruction of the buildings
leased by accidental fire. The express contract and promise was not
discharged by an act for which the lessor was not responsible. * *
* * * This doctrine is challenged by the counsel for the defend• Whitaker vs. Hawley, 25 Kansas Rep.• 674.
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ants, and it is urged that it has no foundation in natural justice ; that
the reasons for its existence have disappeared with the changed conditions of society, and that it ought not to be recognized as the la,,, of
leases in Kansas. * * * * * The feudal system shaped and
modified the common law concerning real estate. Land could not be
taken on execution. Alienation was difficult and expensive. The
landlocd was but the successor of the ancient feudal lord, and his
rights were correspondingly sacred; but now, the holder of real estate
has little or no vantage over the owner of personal property. The
distinctions growing out of the feudal system are disappearing, and this
distinction between the lease of real property and the hiring of chattels is one which sooner or later will cease to exist. * Insurance,
now so com mOll, works a change in the relative position of the parties.
Formerly, the landlQl:d was, to a great extent, at the mercy of the
tenant, who might put an end to his liability by firing the building,
and being in possession could do it easily and without probability of
detection. The burden of such a loss would :filll upon him who had
so little means of prevention or detection; hence, one source of protection ,,,as to continue the liability {or rent. Rut to-day the rule is
IIlsnrance. By this, fire only changes the character of the owner's
property {i'om buildings to money-often a welcome change. And if
the landlord gets the value in money, which he may put at interc"t,
he certainly ought not to receive rent {or that which has ceased to
exist, and thus double his profits, and especially when the insurance
prt:miums are paid by the tenants. In this eilse it appeared that the
landlord had $10,000 insurance on the building which he has received.
In other words, that amount he may put at interest while demanding
rent for the use of property no longer existing whose price that is."
Had Judge Brewer been one of those who yield a servile obedience
to long established precedent, closing his eyes to the truth of history
and turning a deaf ear to the cries of justice, he would have given the
landlord double profits on his wealth, and compelled the tenant to
pay rent for the use of that whieh did not exist. And all this, not
beeause it is just or reasonable, not bemuse the safety of society of our
day demands it, but because another people in another age {(lUnd it a
neeessary restraint on lawlessness. This the court refused to do.
Guided by the light of history, recognizing the changed conditions of
* It was conceded in this case that no rent could be recovered for the use of mere chattels
after their destruction.

Page 686.
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the business world, and moved by the manifest injustice of the demand,
it swept away a long line of venerable authorities and established what
may be callcd a new dispensation of the law of leases.
That the lawyer should be filmiliar with the history of every people
among whom any branch of our law has had its growth, may be
illustrated by an examplc from the Roman law. We borrow almost
the whole of our law governing the liability for negligence from the
civil or Ruman law. The terms in which its principlcs are cxpressed
are taken almost exclusively from the Latin, and their cxaet meaning
can be learned only from the history of the people who' used them.
A striking instance of this is found in the use of the word paterfamilias. By the Roman law, which is also our own, a specialist
who undertakes to do that which is within the scope of his specialty
is bound to exercise such diligence as is commonly exercised by a
diligens, banns, stndiosns paterfamilias, and he is liable for damages
resulting from his failure to do so.
The diligence of the ordinary paterfamilias, as known to English
and American civilization, would hardly come up to our ideas of the
duty of the modern specialist. \Ve would shudder at the thought of
placing our property, our health, and even life itself in the hands of
one from whom the law exacted no greater diligence than that commonlyexercised by the head of a family in his own affairs. The
paterfamilias as we know him would afford a very doubtful criterion
of diligence and care. But when we learn* that the family of classical Rome was indeed a principality, and its head a monarch, whose
descendants, be they ever so remote or ever so scattered, yielded implicit obeLl!ence to his almost unlimited authority, whose daily life
required the exercise of the highest faculties of the mind, we get
quite a different idea ?f the diligence commonly exercised by the
pate1jamilias. The doctor, the druggist, the railroad engineer are no
longer excused by showing the diligence of the head of a family as
known to our civilization, but they are required to exercise" the diligence shown by a good and trustworthy specialist when dealing with
his particular dutiL·s." t
* Hadley's Introduction to Homan Law, 107.
Maine's Ancient Law, 13H.
Gibbon's Decline and Fall, Vol. IV., 341, et seq.
tWharton's Law of Negligence, Second Edition, 1878, page 25.
Man sich unter einen diligens paterfamilias einen durehaus tueehtigen Mann ZIldenken
haben, der ueber seine Angelegenheiten mit voller Aufmerksamkeit und ganzem Fleisse ZIl
wachen gewohntsei. Die Cnlpa des roemischen Rechts, eine civilistisehe Abhandlung von
Johan Christian Hasse, Seite 508. (Quoted by Wharton.)
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vVhen we enter upon the construction of constitutional and statu~
tory law, a thorough knowledge of local history is of the utmost im~
portance to the lawyer. The best guidc to the correct interpretation
of a constitution or statute is the condition of thc people who adopted
it, the wrongs which were to be remedied and mischief to be prevented by it. Noone who does not understand the history of the
colonies, their unsuccessful efforts to establish a general government,
the wrongs thcy suffered and mischief they foresaw, would be a safe
counselor in the interpretation of the constitution by which our sister
states are held together. Noone who does not know of the controversies, differences, clashings of interest, and final compromises that
took place in that remarkable convention, could safely undcrtake to
interpret the instrument they finally adopted. In 1824, in one of the
most important causes cver decided by the federal supreme court, *
Chief Justice Marshall, the great expounder of the constitution,
speaking for the court, held that the power of congress to regulate
commerce between the states was exclusive of state control, and that
the laws of New York granting a monopoly of steam navigation in
the waters of that state were therefore unconstitutional and void.
vVith no precedent to guide him, the great chief justice drew the
argument with which he sustained his position almost wholly from
the history of the colonies at and before the adoption of the constitution. It was in the consideration of these great constitutional questions, untrammelled by precedent, guided only by the history of thE
past, that Marshall's pre-eminent abilities shone at their best. ThiE
country has never yet fully recognized the debt it owes to the historical research of this its greatest jurist. In this case vVebster mad{
one of his most famous arguments, which in its nature was almos1
entirely historical. This form of argument had a peculiar fascinatior
for vVebster and was always powerful when wielded by him. NoonE
can read the argument of vVebster and then the opinion of Marshal
without coming to the conclusion that the former as well as th,
latter did his part" to set free every brook and rivulet in the country.'
The concurring opinion by Justice Johnson is based almost entirel)
upon" the history of the times," and upon" the general understand·
ing of the whole American people when the grant was made." t
*Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton. l.
tGibbons v. Ogden. 9 Wheaton, 225.
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A good example of the value of local history in construing constitutional and statutory hny may be found in a decision of tlH~ supreme
court of l\1iehigau. * ,fhen that remarkable tide of immigration so
rapidly turned the sparsely settled territory of Michigan into a populous state, the spirit of 'western enterprise demanded a vast system
of internal improvements. Accordingly when the people formed the
constitution under which Michigan was, in 1837, admitted into the
Union, they recommended therein an extensive system of railroads
and canals to be constructed by the state at public expense. The legislature, in carrying out this recommendation, burdened the people
with a debt of millions; and after destroying public credit, stopped
but little short of a disgraceful repudiation. For all this burden and
disgrace the state had nothing to show, except some unfinished railroads, which were soon sold for a small portion of the money expended on them. ,Vhen the constitution of 1850 was adopted, the
people, still feeling keenly the burden and disgrace brought upon them
by theiie visionary schemes, provided in the new instrument that the
state should in no manner aid works of iuternal improvement. Thus
the people of Michigan absolutely prohibited in 1850 that which they
had recommended in 1837. Soon there occurred one of those unaccountable oscillations in popular judgment upon financial questions
to which the American people seem to be peculiarly subject. t In
1869, the legislature, yielding to popular demand, provided by a general law for the granting of aid to railroads by the several municipal
subdivisions of thc state. Millions of debt had already been contracted by the cities and towns of Michigan under this statute when
its constitutionality was first presented to the supreme court of the
state in 1871.
That court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Cooley, held the law
unconstitutional and void. It was urged that other states had construed a similar provision in their constitutions as prohibiting only
the state as such ii'om incurring debts in aid of "uch enterprises, while
it left the subdivisions thereof free to give such aid as they saw fit,
and pay the same by general taxation. In reply to this argument
the learned justice said, that whatever might be the just and proper
construction of this provision when found in the constitutions of otber
• Bay City v. The State Treasurer, 23 Mich., 449.
t For an interesting account of the variable policy of Michigan on the question of internal
Judge Cooley's" Michigan," in the A.merican Commonwealih Series, chap.

~v:ovcment, see
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states, whose history had been different, the public history of :Michigan left no doubt th~lt its pcople intenckod to deprive, not only the
state as a whole, but its component parts as well, of the power to
repeat the folly of the past. This decision has become a part of the
history of the state, and has determined its policy ever since on the
question of internal improvements. It is referred to here because the
construction there given to an important constitutional provision is
based solely upon the public history of the state and the well known
feeling of the people at the time of its adoption. Here, then, we find
one of America's foremost constitutional lawyers recognizing and
adopting the public history of a state as the best guide in the interpretation of its fllndamentallaw.
'When we reach the broader domain of international law, we must
rely wholly upon history for our precedents. Here there is no
supreme power to prescribe rules of action; no court with jurisdiction
to decide or power to enforce its decrees. The law by which nations
are to be judged, in war or in peace, are to be learned only from the
public history of the nations we call civilized; and the history of the
intercourse of one nation with another is so intimately connected with
the internal history of each that no one can understand the former
without some knowledge of the latter.
Much might be said, did time permit, on the value of history in
solving the ever recurring problems involving the security of life, liberty, and property. All these questions have arisen and been answered
in some way by every civilized people. The communistic. and nihilistic
tendencies of the present would seem to indicate that these problems
have not been finally disposed of, and that the lawyer of the near future may be called upon to reconsider and perhaps readjust them. In
any discussion of these great questions, involving as they do the rights
of all, the practical answers given to them by other nations in other
times must always be of the highest importance.
It is perhaps needless to say that the study of history to yield the
benefits here indieated must be something more than the daily eonning
of a given number of pages in a text book. 'What the student needs to
be taught is not the facts of history, but how to find them for himself.
In no branch of study isit more important that the student should do
the work himself than in history. No one would now attempt toteaeh
chemistry and botany without requiring of the student practical work
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in the laboratory amI the field. ~What the laboratory is to the student
ofehemistry, what the fields are to the student of botany, the well furnished library is to the student of history. The text book and the instructor are valuable as guides; but after all, that which is most valuable is obtained only by the individual research of the student himself.
In this research the student should be led as near as possible to the
original sources from which the faets are to be ascertained. Our own
national history furnishes a fertile field for investigation, and the ease
with which its primary and secondary sources may be obtained renders
it peculiarly inviting. And may we not hope that at no very distant
day the archives of this society may contain material for a comprehensive study of the history of our own commonwealth.
The range of history, like that oflaw, is limited only by the boundary that circumscribes the life of man. The historian deals with life
as fonnd entombed in the mute records of the past. The lawyer struggles with life governed by the passions, the pr~juelices, the hopes, anel
the fears of the present. Both alike, in reaching their conclusions,
must tread upon uncertain ground and remain content with proof far
short of the absolute. Law stands foremost among the practical sciences as an aid to history, and history in turn becomes the interpreter of
law. As the lawyer gathers the f~lCts of his case from the uncertain
memories of Iiving witnesses, as he draws his principles from the contradictory statements contained in his books, so the student of history
mnst cross-examine his authors, probe their motives, estimate the influence of their prejudices, balance their testimony against that of others,
and finally determine, by a preponderance of proof~ the point at issllc.
So intimate is the relatioJl behYcen history and Jaw that the best prc'paration for the stndy of either is found in the thorough study of the,
other

